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Hirst: Admissibility against the Principal of Statements Made against His Interest by the Agent
NOTE AND COMMENT
AGENCY: ADMISSIBILITY AGAINST THE PRINCIPAL
OF STATEMENTS MADE AGAINST HIS INTEREST
BY THE AGENT.
When an agent makes statements against the interest of
his principal while executing his agency authority, there are at
least two independent grounds upon which the statements may
be admitted in a subsequent suit against his principal by a
third party. For such statements to be admitted against the
principal on the ground that it was an agent making them, it
must be shown that such agent was hired actually for the purpose of making statements of this kind.1 If this be established,
the time, place and circumstances under which they were made
are not otherwise important.! On the other hand, if the statement be admitted solely under an appropriate rule of evidence
(as a spontaneous exclamation, an operative fact, etc.), then
the fact that they were made by an agent is irrelevant to their
admissibility.!
The above two strictly independent bases for admission of
statements against interest are now so confused that the courts,
including the Montana Court,' fail in a large number of cases
'Pan-American Petroleum Co. et al. v. United States (1926) C. C. A.
9th, 9 F. (2d) 761 at p. 769; Rosenberger v. H. E. Wilcox Motor Co.
(1920) 145 Minn. 408, 177 N. W. 625; Lacheck v. Duluth-Superior Transit Co. (1937) 199 Minn. 519, 273 N. W. at p. 369; Chantry v. Pettit
Motor Co., Miller v. Same (1930) 156 S. C. 1, 152 S. E. 753 at p. 757
(dissenting opinion) ; City of Chicago v. Greer (1870) 9 Wall. 726, 19
L. Ed. 769; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Coleman et al. (1857) 18 Ill. 298,
68 Am. Dec. 544; Xenia Bank v. Stewart et al. (1885) 114 U. S. 224,
5 S. Ct. 845, 29 L. Ed. 101; Price v. American Agri. Chem. Co.
(1934) 173 S. C. 518, 176 S. E. 352. (Some of these cases state the
res gestae rule; they all include the correct statement of the agency
principle involved.); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, (1933) Vol. 2, §288, p.
647; TIFFANY ON AGENCY, (2d ed. 1924) §106, p. 290: ". . . the state-

ment of a servant or agent is admissible as an admission, if it is made
when he is engaged in some authorized transaction, and it is within
the scope of his authority In that transaction to make the statement."
'Rosenberger v. H. E. Wilcox Motor Co. (1920) 145 Minn. 408, 177 N.
W. 625; Snipes v. Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Electric Corporation et al.
(1929) 151 S. C. 391, 149 S. E. 111, p. 115 (dissenting opinion by Cothran J.) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, (1933) Vol. 2, §288, p. 650 (Comment
c) ; VI WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1756, p. 162, §1769, p. 184;
Professor James Bradley Thayer (1881) Am. LAw REV. XV, 80, quoted by VI WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, (3d ed. 1940) p. 184.
'Burns v. Smith (1898) 21 Mont. 251, 53 P. 742, 69 Am. St. Rep. 653;
Roberts et al. v. Port Blakely Mill Co. (1902) 30 Wash. 25, 70 P. 111;
Lambert v. LaConner Trading and Transportation Co. (1902) 30 Wash.
346, 70 P. 960; Forester v. Southern Pacific Co. (1913) 36 Nev. 247,
134 P. 753, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1; VI WIGMOBE ON EVIDENCE (3d ed.
1940) §§1745 et 8eq., p. 131; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Vol. 2, §289, (Comment d), p. 653.
'Ryan v. Gilmer (1877) 2 Mont. 517, 25 Am. Rep. 744, and cases cited in

footnote 10, infra.
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involving this question to recognize the distinction. They err
in considering the problem solely from the standpoint of the
supposed evidence rule as expressed in the old, much abused,
so-called res gestae doctrine. These courts, and numerous authorities,' seem to assume that the res gestae doctrine as traditionally stated forms a single basis upon which to establish the
admissibility of statements as a rule of agency, on the one hand,
or a rule of evidence, on the other. The objection to res gestae,
'One of the most striking aspects of this confusion Is that the publicists
have so uncritically perpetuated it. Wigmore thinks that Greenleaf
may have been principally responsible for the extreme looseness in the
use of the term res gestae, which has since plagued both the law of
evidence and of agency, citing "1842, Professor Simon Greenleaf, Evidence, §108" in support of that conclusion.

VI WIGMOHBE oN EVIDENCE,

(3d ed. 1940) p. 167. The entire problem is keynoted in the encyclopedias and digests almost exclusively under "Evidence". To make matters worse, both the encyclopedias and some authorities on evidence
assume that "admissions" by an agent may be discussed indiscriminately along with other statements, representations, and declarations
of an agent-and subject to the same general rules, apparently. Indeed, in JONE ON EVIDENCE (1st ed. 1896) §§256 and 257 it appears
that the word "admissions" is used as a generic term to cover all of
such verbal acts by an agent. So we find the question of the "power"
of an agent to give a warranty given as an example of an "admission"
or "declaration" by an agent. This grouping is continued in the second edition. A more grievous error from the standpoint of the substantive law of Agency hardly can be imagined. The power of an
agent to charge his principal in tort is broader in some respects than
to charge him strictly in contract. Since some of such statements
may amount to deceitful representations, while others will not, clearly
they are subject to substantially different rules as to when the principal will be liable. Corpus Juris considers the question of "admissions" principally under the topic of Evidence. 22 C. J., Evidence §440,
ff. Although 22 C. J. contains a statement which seems to recognize
the dual character of the problem herein involved, (id. §443) there is
little suggestion of the distinct character of the problem in 2. C. J.,
Agency, §541 ff., where representations, declarations and admissions of
an agent are discussed together. Though 3 C. J. S., Agency, §236 ff.
declares that tort elements may be present as to some declarations
while not as to others, it makes little effort to formulate a precise
body of rules indicating the scope of an agent's power to charge his
principal for strict admissions. While Am. Jur. emphasises that, for
an agent's admissions to bind his principal they must be within the
scope of the former's authority, it says nothing to indicate how that
is determined until it contributes the following: "In some cases the
admissibility of the statement of an agent against his principal has
been predicated upon the theory that such statement constituted a part
of the res gestae of a transaction in which the agent engaged in be-

half of the principal . . .his declarations are binding if made at any

time before the transaction is terminated." It throws no further light
on the subject. 20 AM. Jua., Evidence, §596, p. 505. Cf. RESTATEmENT
op AGENCY, (1933) §§63 (1), (2), Vol. 1, p. 150 (Authority to Warrant or Represent) ; id. §162, Vol. 1, p. 397 (Unauthorized Representations) ; id. §256 et seq., Vol. 1, p. 571 (Misrepresentations) ; M4. §284 et
seq., Vol. 2, p. 637 (Admissibility in Evidence of Statements of Agents).
Note the detail with which different kinds of statements are treated.
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when used as a yardstick for any purpose in the law, is cogently
stated by Professor Wigmore:
"The phrase 'res gestae' has long been not only entirely
useless, but even positively harmful. It is useless, because
every rule of Evidence to which it has ever been applied
exists as a part of some other well-established principle and
can be explained in the terms of that principle. It is harmful, because by its ambiguity it invites the confusion of one
rule with another and thus creates uncertainty as to the
limitations of both. It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated, as a vicious element in our legal phraseology. No
rule of Evidence can be created or applied by the mere muttering of a shibboleth.'"
Exactly the same criticism, with even greater force, may be
made of its use in the Law of Agency.
It appears that the first Montana case7 considering statements by an agent as admissions' against his principal's interest
realized that the essential agency question was whether, in fact,
the principal had authorized his agent to make such statements.
However, the history of the present Montana law governing such
admissions begins with Ryan v. Gilmer? This case and several
following'* are excellent examples of what Wigmore had in mind
when he said:
". .. judges sometimes have discussed the two principles (evidence and agency) in their application to personal injuries, as if they were but one principle. That there
are two distinct and unrelated principles involved must be
apparent; . . . '
VI WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE

7

(3d ed. 1940) §1767, p. 182.

1Herbert v. King (1872) 1 Mont. 475.

'The "admissions" herein considered are statements which one party

to a suit charges were made by the other party prior thereto, which
will prejudice the latter's case if admitted-generally by contradicting
testimony given at the trial by the latter. Whether it be deemed an
exception to the Hearsay Evidence rule, as a form of "statement
against interest", or not subject thereto in the first place, is not important for our purpose. Hence the very interesting argument between Professors Morgan and Wigmore on that point need not concern us. See: Professor Edmund M. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARy. L. REV. (1929) p. 461; IV WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1080a.
'(1877) 2 Mont. 517, 25 Am. Rep. 744.
"Josephi et al. v. Mady Clothing Co. (1893) 13 Mont. 195, 33 P. 1;
Missoula Mercantile Co. v. O'Donnell (1900) 24 Mont. 65, 60 P. 594,
reh. den. 24 Mont. 65, 60 P. 991; Hogan v. Kelly (1903) 29 Mont. 485,
75 P. 81; Poindexter & Orr Livestock Company v. Oregon Shortline
Railroad Company (1905) 33 Mont. 338, 83 P. 886.
UIV WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1078, p. 121. See also Thayer's article cited in footnote 2, supra.
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The first Montana case fully to recognize the fact that two
separate sets of principles were involved was Callahan v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co.' Herein the court on appeal admitted almost identical statements made by the conductor and roadmaster
thirty or forty minutes after the accident to the effect that the
parting of the train was caused by defective coupling, a worn
lock-block. In the lower court, this evidence was excluded on
the ground that the declarations were not a part of the res
gestae, and were therefore incompetent. Mr. Chief Justice
Brantly, delivering the opinion of the court on appeal, recognizing that these statements could not be admitted under the strict
res gestae rule (if you please) of evidence, as they were made a
half hour or more after the accident, said:
"But we think the evidence competent upon another theory, viz., as admissions by the agents of the defendant within
the scope of their employment while engaged in the discharge of their duties .... It is a well-settled rule that when

an agent is vested with authority to perform any act for
his principal, his words-his verbal acts-while engaged in
that business, are a part of the res gestae of that business.
They are therefore the words and acts of the principal and
may be proved against him ....

If, however, the appointed

work has been completed, any statement made by the agent
with reference to it is, under all the authorities . . . a mere

narrative of a past transaction and is not admissible under
the res gestae rule. It is, as to the principal, mere hearsay. ' '
Chief Justice Brantly finally concluded that the statements
were not so remote from the principal's business as to be a mere
narrative of past events under his own rule. Thus he seems deliberately to have raised a new criterion or basis for measuring
the scope of an agent's authority to bind his principal in a par12(1913) 47 Mont. 401, 133 P. 687, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 587.

The same
Justice decided the principal case and the Poindexter case (footnote
10, supra). In the latter, the Court seemed to recognize two possible
grounds for admitting the statements of the section boss, but failed to
formulate a fully developed rule of agency indicating when the agent
actually has authority to so charge his principal. The Callahan case
also cites Hogan v. Kelly, supra, note 10, and Ryan v. Gilmer, 8upra,
note 9, as authority for its ruling.
"Callahan v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. (1913) 47 Mont. 412, 413, 133 P.
690, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590, 591. It should be observed that even the
Callahan case and all others which state the rule in this manner fail
to separate completely the substantive agency question from the law
of evidence. The assumption that the agent never has power to make
a statement as to a past transaction shows the continuing influence
of the law of evidence and the vague res geatae doctrine.
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ticular respect, using the old evidentiary term of res gestae as a
foundation for delimiting that authority."
The upshot of the rule stated in the Callahan case, for determining when an agent has the power to make his principal
responsible for the former's statements amounting to admissions,
is that the agent shall be deemed to have such power to make
any statements he takes a notion to, concerning his principal's
business-if he makes them while engaged in that business. That
is, if such statements are part of the res gestae of the transaction that the agent is properly engaged in, that fact alone incorporates into the agent's authority the power to make such statements binding on the principal. If, however, they are not "part
of such res gestae", it will be outside of the agent's authority
to make them. This, however, is precisely what we are told is
not the law by the Restatement:
" (1). Authority to do an act or conduct a transaction
does not of itself include authority to make statements concerning the act or transaction."' "
Thus it becomes clear that our res gestae rule, in the agency
field, is a two-edged fallacy. It serves to admit some statements
that should be excluded, while excluding others that should be
admitted. This fact can be shown by the following case: A customer complained to the foreman of a warehouse that water had
leaked through the roof onto his stored goods and had damaged
them. The foreman replied that he had told his employer about
the condition of the roof; also, that other customers had registered the same complaint with him. In a subsequent suit" for
the injury to the goods, the customer plaintiff sought to admit
both of the statements by the foreman. The only real agency
question was whether, according to some of the recognized criteria,' the employer may be found to have authorized the fore'4JONES ON EVIDENCE, (2d ed. 1926), see footnote 23, infra.
"RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Vol. 2, §288, p. 647.
" 'Hansen et al. v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co. (1920) 97 Or. 190,
188 P. 963, reh. den. 97 Or. 190, 191 P. 655.
"For a case which, if interpreted literally, might be said to formulate

an even more vague rule for measuring the extent of an agent's power to charge his principal for the former's slander (and presumably
torts generally), see Keller v. Safeway Stores, Inc. et al. (1940) 111

Mont. 28, 108 P. (2d) 605, commented on by Albert Angstman in the
current MONTANA LAW REVIEw, p. 75. We are told by Wigmore that
there have been various spurious enlargements of the phrase res
gestae, among which is "part of the transaction". VI WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1757, p. 166. If, to charge a principal with
the agent's tort, it is only necessary to find that it was an "incident
of the employment", how does that differ from "part of the transaction", "an incident of the res gestae" (Earlywine v. C. I. T. Corporation (1940) 110 Mont. 295, 101 P. (2d) 59, Headnote 2), "part of the
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man to make either or both statements, i.e., did he have an express authority, or were such statements reasonably necessary or
incidental to his express authority; or was there a course of conduct, or a custom, showing such authority. Under this approach,
the agent probably would be found to have no authority to
charge his principal with either statement-but he might have
authority to make both statements. Yet the Court admitted the
first statement because "part of the res gestae", and excluded
the latter one because a "mere narrative of a past event".
Again," where, after examining the bank's books, the then bank
president represented to the holder of certain certificates of deposit that the money represented by the certificates was received
by the bank when the certificates were issued, the representation was held not admissible in a subsequent suit against the
bank, the Court relying in considerable part at least upon the
proposition that it was a mere narrative of a past event by one
not participating in the original transaction. The Court didn't
even ask whether one of the primary duties of the president
might be to perform just such acts. On the other hand, in a
suit to recover the subscription price for stock purchased, a well
considered Minnesota case" ruled admissible against the company an admission of its president as to the value of the stock
when sold (the statement having been made months after the
stock sale), as being incidental to his powers to negotiate an adjustment.
The cases immediately following the Callahancase in Montana do not state clearly that they recognize the presence of the
two distinct problems involved. In Raish v. Orchard Canal Co.'
the Court admitted statements by the president of the defendant
corporation, made while in the active discharge of his official
duties, and at the time of the occurrence to which they related,
adopting the principle laid down in the Callahan case. However, Exchange State Bank of Glendive v. Occident Elevator
res gestae"? The Keller case suggests that its rule is even more vague
than the res gestae rule governing admissions in that it says that the
"acts" out of which the tort arose need not have been performed on
behalf of the principal. The Callahan case insists on that much before
the agent's admissions charge the principal. As suggested in the comment on the Keller case, however, it is extremely unlikely that the
Court intended to lay down any such rule in that case.
"First National Bank of Sweetwater v. Rust et al. (1919) C. C. A. 5th,
168 C. C. A. 241, 257 F. 29.
"Rosenberger v. H. E. Wilcox Motor Co. (1920) 145 Minn. 408, 177 N. W.
625.
"Fowlie v. Cruse (1916) 52 Mont. 222, 157 P. 958; Raish v. Orchard
Canal Co. (1923) 67 Mont. 140, 218 P. 655.
'(1923) 67 Mont. 140, 218 P. 655.
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Company' does seem to recognize the agency problem apart from
the evidence question, quoting verbatim the language of the
Court in the Callahancase as its authority.
T~he extent to which the Court in Rossberg v. Montgomery
Ward & Co.' has recognized the confusion which exists by reason of the engrafting of the so-called res gestae rule upon the
agency doctrine is not clear. In this suit to recover damages for
an alleged injury caused by falling in the defendant's store because of an oily substance on the floor, the plaintiff sought to
introduce statements made twenty days later by the manager to
the effect that there was no excuse for the presence of the substance on the floor, and that it had been there long enough to
have been removed. In rejecting this evidence, Mr. Justice
Arnold, writing the majority opinion, said:
"It is elemental that admissions or declarations of the
officers or agents of private corporations are not admissible
unless they are made while acting within the scope of their
authority as a part of the res gestae relating to the present
transaction ....
The statements claimed to have been made
by the defendant . . . are not res gestae, having been made

about three weeks after the accident; neither do they tend to
prove negligence as to the defendant company, as they were
not made by the agent while accompanying an act which he
was authorized to do. They were, at most, mere exclamations or conclusions on the part of the agent, and not binding. ' Y
(1933) 95 Mont. 78, 24 P. (2d) 126, 90 A. L. R. 740. The Court is very

careful to establish that the agent was, in general, trying to carry out
the principal's business when he made the admissions. However, having established this, it seems to assume that any statements made in
connection therewith charge the principal, as suggested by the Callahan case.
2(1939) 110 Mont. 154, 99 P. (2d) 979.
mid. at p. 163 and p. 164. In citing approvingly JONES ON EvIDENCE,
the case cites "JONES ON EVIDENCE, 2d ed., par. 268", which is an erroneous citation. In the first edition, Sections 256-7 are the relevant
sections, and in the second edition Section 944 ff. is pertinent. The extent of the confusion prevalent In treating of this problem is revealed
in JONES ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) §944. Apparently conscious of the
distinct agency question, he there attempts to state a rule for measuring the agent's authority, similar to that laid down in the Callahan
case:

".

. . whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract

for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of
any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of, the particular transaction .

.

. is, in

legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence against
such principal. But, . . . it is well established that parties are not
chargeable with the declarations of their agents, unless ... made dur-

ing the transaction of business by the agent for the principal, and in
relation to such business and within the scope of the agency; in other
words, unless they may be deemed a part of the res gestae.. ." The
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The Court includes a quotation from Corpus Juris' which
seems to recognize the distinct agency question, but it is not
clear to what extent the decision itself recognized the question
of whether or not the agent had authority to make the statements as an independent basis for their admission."
In Earlywine v. C. I. T. Corporation,' decided during the
same term of court as the Rossberg case and by the same Justice,
a curious condition obtains. In order to charge the defendant
for damage to the plaintiff's car, the latter sought to introduce
statements by the defendant's cashier to the effect that the defendant had already taken out new insurance on the plaintiff's
car. The relevant headnote seems to say that the statement was
admissible as an admission because part of the res gestae: "...
held not objectionable as having been made outside the scope
of the cashier's authority, it rather having been an incident of
the res gestae. . ." However, this does not correspond to the ac-

tual ruling of the Court on this point:
"The statement . ..

would not be sufficient, standing

alone, to bind the defendant as the representation of an
agent authorized to make such a statement. ..
unfortunate result of assuming that "representations", "declarations",
and "admissions" could all be discussed under one rule is indicated
here.
"Rossberg v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1939) 110 Mont. at pp. 163 and
164, 99 P. (2d) at p. 982 quoting extensively from 22 C. J. Evidence
p. 379, §443 (4) Narrative Statements, 22 C. J. p. 386, §460 (d)
Agents of Private Corporations (1) In General. See footnote 5, supra,
"The dissent takes the view that the manager's statements should have
been admitted under certain rules of evidence rather than as a binding
admission by an agent. Though beyond the scope of this comment,
there seems to be substantial supporting authority. VI WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§1766 ff., p. 177 (Utterances material to the
case as a part of the issue, or as circumstantial evidence of negligence) ; RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, Vol. 2, §284, p. 637 (Operative and
Relevant Statements) ; 22 C. J. 382 (note 55e), cited in this opinion.
2(1940) 110 Mont. 295, 101 P. (2d) 59. It was unnecessary for the
Court to consider extensively the cashier's authority to make such an
admission against her principal, since it found that the latter was
chargeable with several acts, including the accepting of the insurance
premium and leading the plaintiff reasonably to believe that his car
was covered. However, the principal case relied on for the conclusion
that her statement, standing alone, would not bind her principal, forces
the suggestion that such conclusion simply is a reiteration of the Callahan case. The principal case cited (Ashley v. Safeway Stores, Inc.

(1935) 100 Mont. 312, 47 P. (2d) 53) quotes

JONES ON

EVIDENCE

(2d

ed. 1926) §946 extensively. The extremely vague way in which re8
gestae is used in the Earlywine case, demonstrates its unreliable character even in limiting the scope of the transaction in connection with
which an agent's statements must be made to charge the principal,
under the Callahan rule.
'Earlywine v. C. I. T. Corporation (1940) 110 Mont. 298, 101 P. (2d) 60.
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Treating the latter quotation from the text as controlling,
even then the case helps us little in interpreting the Rossberg
case, or in clarifying the law as to admissions in Montana, because the Court does not suggest why the statement would not
be so admissible. It admits the statement on other grounds.
It should be realized that statements which are spontaneous
exclamations must automatically be admitted under principles of
evidence, though statements not admissible under evidence rules
should not be excluded automatically if there is agency involved.
The authority of the agent to make such statements, not merely
to do the act in connection with which the statements are made,
should be inquired into to determine whether or not they are admissible against the principal's interest under rules of agency
law. The term res gestae should be wholly repudiated as a principle of agency.
It is submitted that both the legal basis for, and the authority upon which the Callahan rule is predicated are so questionable that the Montana Supreme Court would be justified in reexamining the entire question of an agent's admissions against
his principal.
-Bill Hirst.

BILLS AND NOTES: NEGOTIABILITY OF BILLS AND
NOTES SECURED BY COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS
Uncertainty and confusion exist in Montana with respect
to the negotiability of instruments, otherwise negotiable, which
are secured by collateral agreements.' The extent of the confusion can best be determined by comparing the Montana decisions upon the subject with the rules formulated by the
weight of authority in other states. Clarity in presentation
of those rules demands a classification of the fact situations
with regard to the form of the instruments involved as follows:
(1) Instruments containing no reference to the collateral
agreement. (2) Instruments containing a mere reference to
'The word "secured" as used in this discussion extends not only to
those situations where a collateral agreement is given as security for
payment of a bill or note, but to the cases where the collateral agreement is the consideration for which the instrument is given or the
transaction giving rise to it.
No attempt is made herein to analyze the cases involving the right
of a transferee of a bill or note secured by a collateral agreement to
claim as a holder in due course where the agreement shows on its face
an infirmity in the bill or note or a defect in the title of the person
negotiating it.
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